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5. From insurance or insertion to rights and responsibilities: the 
shifting logics of unemployment protection in France 
 
Daniel Clegg 
 
 
The notion of fundamental rights, enjoyed on the basis of common citizenship if not 
shared humanity, spread only slowly to cover rights to economic and income security 
(Marshall 1950).  Of these social rights, it is those for able-bodied people of working 
age who find themselves temporarily without work simply as a result of the 
functioning of competitive labour markets – those who in modern society we have 
come to call the unemployed - that have traditionally proved most controversial and 
contested.  Because it does not derive from any measurable physical cause such as ill 
health, old age or disability, the absence of work through unemployment is always 
vulnerable to being seen as at least partially self-inflicted, and the provision of income 
support and other social services to individuals in this situation is, a result, suspected 
of encouraging indolence and undermining the work ethic (Pennings 1990; Van 
Langendonck 1997).  Such fears help to explain why protection against the risk of 
unemployment has typically been one of the last-enacted spheres of welfare state 
activity, in spite of the economic role it can play (Korpi 2006).  They are also the 
reason that protection of the jobless seems to represent a sort of ‘final frontier’ for 
fundamental social rights. 
 
For all its still frequent identification as la patrie des droits de l’Homme (the country 
of the Rights of Man), this reticence towards universal rights for the unemployed has 
been no less evident in the social history of France.  Indeed, as this chapter will 
discuss, even after the belated introduction of a compulsory system of protection 
against unemployment at the high point of French post-war welfarism, the logic of 
citizens’ rights long continued to play very little role in discourses around, and 
policies for, the support of the unemployed in France.  However in recent years the 
logic of rights has come to have a growing influence in French unemployment 
protection.  It is argued here that this development has been driven less by changing 
legal norms or social justice claims than it has by general economic and structural 
reform pressures, as well as by more specific attempts to create a foundation for the 
deployment of more efficient supply-side labour reallocation initiatives.  Thus the 
recent rise of a more rights-based conception of support for the unemployed in France 
has had a, possibly inevitable, corollary in the assertion and enforcement of individual 
economic responsibilities. 
 
The chapter is organised in four main sections.  The first of these recounts how a 
compulsory national-level unemployment protection system was eventually 
introduced in France as a result of a collective agreement between the trade unions 
and the employers, and constructed at one remove from the central state, drawing the 
latent logic of unemployment protection policies away from rights and towards a 
pseudo-contractual insurance model.  The second section explains how the inherent 
limits of this dominant insurance approach were mitigated by the complementary 
development of so-called insertion policies, based on the provision of individualised 
services to facilitate social and labour market integration of ‘problem groups’, rather 
than on standardised and general income support.  Up to the late 1980s, French 
unemployment policy rested on a division of programmatic labour between insurance 
and insertion, in which the concept of universal rights to income protection played 
virtually no role.  The third section discusses how this division of labour has since 
been disturbed by economic pressures, opening the way to the gradual development of 
a more unified approach to unemployment protection based on both rights and 
responsibilities.  The fourth section briefly concludes by drawing out some of the 
implications of this development. 
 
 
A FUNCTION OF INDUSTRY: THE SOCIAL PARTNERS, 
UNEMPLOYMENT PROTECTION AND THE LOGIC OF INSURANCE 
 
As in many other countries, sweeping changes were introduced in France in the field 
of social policy in the wake of the Second World War, when the foundations of a 
comprehensive system of social protection, a ‘welfare state’,1 were laid.  However, 
unlike elsewhere, protection against the risk of unemployment was excluded from the 
scope of these otherwise wide-ranging reforms.  Up to the late 1950s France’s system 
of unemployment protection comprised an uneven patchwork system of localised 
social assistance and the rump of voluntary state-subsidised insurance funds, the 
number of which had declined greatly from the 1920s as a result of the depression of 
the 1930s and the outlawing of their main sponsors, trade unions, during the period of 
the Vichy government.  Plans to extend the new social protection system to cover 
unemployment were floated in the late 1940s, but not pursued.  Although the 
immediate post-war years were generally conducive to social reform in France, this 
was not enough to overcome the ‘liberal doubt’ that had long stymied plans for 
compulsory unemployment protection (Saint-Jours 1981, p. 120). [is p.20 correct – 
the page range in the list of references is 93-149] [DC - Corrected to p. 120] 
 
This was to change in 1958, when negotiations initiated by the main employers’ 
confederation (Conseil National du Patront Français, CNPF) and one of the five 
representative trade union confederations Force Ouvrière (FO) eventually resulted in 
the signing of a national level inter-professional collective agreement establishing an 
unemployment insurance system.  With France’s recent entry into the single market 
presaging a wave of economic restructuring, there was growing awareness of the need 
for a better system of income support to accompany, and facilitate, the industrial 
‘shake out’.  Suspecting that the government was preparing to legislate on this issue 
anyway, the CNPF was anxious to guarantee its influence over the shape of the new 
system, and so proposed a collectively negotiated and self-financing system managed 
on a strict parity basis by the ‘social partners’, subject only to ex post agreement and 
erga omnes extension by the state.  Force Ouvrière was persuaded of the advantages 
of such a system mainly by the prospect of securing a greater managerial role and 
control over the distribution of administrative jobs and access to funds that would 
accompany it, than it had had in the general social security system, in the latter, union 
participation on administrative boards was on the basis of an election system that 
favoured FO’s larger rivals, above all the communist Confédération Générale du 
Travail (CGT).  Also eager to weaken the relative position of the CGT, and pleased to 
be able to claim credit for a concern with social issues without engaging any public 
funds, the returning President de Gaulle encouraged and supported the CNPF-FO 
initiative (Daniel 1997). 
 
The agreement signed in December 1958 established a network of insurance funds 
organised mainly by region and placed under the authority of a national level body, 
the Union Nationale Interprofessionnelle pour l’Emploi dans l’Industrie et le 
Commerce (UNEDIC).  Much like the funds of the general social security system, 
these funds collected proportional payroll contributions from employers and 
employees, and paid earnings-related benefits for a limited period to insured 
unemployed workers.  The governing board of UNEDIC, composed only of 
representatives of workers and employers, was the policy-making body of the system, 
with responsibility for setting contribution and benefit rates and all other eligibility 
and entitlement parameters.  Though compulsory, nation-wide, and on the surface 
rather similar to the general social security system (Palier 2005, p. 123), the system of 
unemployment protection was therefore in some important respects ‘essentially 
private’ (Meyers 1965, p. 371). 
 
This had implications for the way that French unemployment insurance came to 
function, relative to the general social security system.  While the latter was clearly a 
social insurance system, the emphasis had always been as much on the ‘social’ as the 
‘insurance’.  Thus, while the system was intended to be self-funding, with a balance 
between incomes (contributions) and expenditures (benefits), this was tempered by 
the clear desire of its architects to allow social protection to play a contra-cyclical 
economic role, if necessary by allowing deficits to mount in times of economic 
downturn (Laroque 1948, p. 626).  At the micro-level, while benefit entitlement was 
initially reserved for contributors and their families, the existence of a minimum 
contribution requirement was seen as a transitory measure, necessary and desirable 
only until enough of the population was included in the system (Laroque 1948, p. 
643).  However, in unemployment insurance the avoidance of deficits over the 
relatively short term was always an indispensable aspect of the system’s autonomous 
self-regulating character, and a guarantee of its prized autonomy from the state.  In 
this context, some form of rationing of access was always necessary given the 
employers’ concern to limit payroll tax rates to ‘manageable’ levels; therefore 
maintaining a link between contribution and entitlement at the individual level was 
from the outset seen as important.  Indeed, one of the employers’ main reservations 
about the possible extension of the general social security system to further social 
risks like unemployment in the 1950s had precisely been the weak application of the 
insurance principle, which it claimed it intended to enforce far more strictly through 
UNEDIC (Daniel 1997).  If all social benefits in France gradually came to be 
perceived as a form of ‘deferred salary’ and hence the legitimate property of 
contributors to the system (Palier 2005, p. 79), unemployment benefits would also be 
perceived in this way, even though this perception was contrary to the intentions of 
the system’s founders.  The logic was less one of rights for the unemployed than of a 
collective saving fund for workers. 
 
In this way it was the logic of insurance, rather than the logic of rights, that was 
normatively central to French unemployment insurance, and although the system was 
explicitly one of inter-professional solidarity and risk redistribution, entitlements were 
always in principle reserved to those who had contributed something and were thus 
solidly ‘affiliated’ to the system.  This said, there was a considerable gap between 
principle and practice in the early years of the system’s operation, when in the context 
of a buoyant economy it was possible to expand entitlement while maintaining a 
financial surplus in the collective fund.  Thus, up to the early 1970s, protection was 
extended to a number of groups such as former agricultural workers, expatriates 
returning to France after Algerian independence and certain groups of young labour 
market entrants with specific technical qualifications (Daniel & Tuchszirer 1999, pp. 
193-197), who would have been excluded due to inadequate contribution records if 
the logic of insurance had been rigidly applied.  However these identifiable groups 
benefited from explicitly ‘political’ concessions by the social partners to the demands 
of governments, thereby constituting exceptions that confirmed the rule that in France 
unemployment benefits were normally paid as a return on contributions made in 
salaried employment, and not as a right of citizens. 
 
In the immediate aftermath of the oil price shocks of the 1970s the social partners 
negotiated contribution rate increases that allowed the generosity of unemployment 
benefit to be maintained, and even enhanced, as the balance between contributors to 
and beneficiaries of the insurance system shifted sharply in favour of the latter.  But 
as the employment crisis gradually came to be seen as permanent and structural rather 
than temporary and conjunctural, and as employers’ grumblings about the need to 
moderate the growth of ‘social charges’ turned into a clamour, so pressures grew for 
the actual functioning of the unemployment protection system to be realigned on its 
underlying insurance logic.  The then president of the CNPF argued explicitly for the 
need to better ‘distinguish insurance expenditures, for employees having worked and 
contributed, [under] the responsibility of the social partners, and solidarity 
expenditures for other job-seekers’ (Chotard 1984, p. 372).  [is page 372 correct? The 
page range in the list of references is 484-486] [DC – page number correct, but 
reference wrong, changed in list of refs] Eager to see the jointly managed system 
survive, the unions acquiesced and in February 1984 signed an agreement that linked 
entitlement to unemployment insurance benefits more closely than before to 
individual contribution histories. 
 
Under the terms of this emblematic reform, those with no or only limited employment 
histories and contribution records were excluded from unemployment insurance 
altogether, or saw their period of entitlement reduced, while at the same time better 
contributors were rewarded with improved replacement rates and extended periods of 
entitlement (Daniel & Tuchszirer 1999, p. 290).  This emphasis was further reinforced 
in a 1992 reform when, in a context of fast-rising unemployment, the social partners 
agreed to again raise the minimum contribution requirements for accessing 
unemployment insurance benefits as well as to further limit the duration of 
entitlement for those with short periods of prior work and contribution.  Where 
previously someone entering unemployment after between 6 and 12 months of 
employment could receive unemployment benefit for between 15 and 21 months 
depending on age, this was henceforth reduced to a maximum of 7 months for all.  By 
contrast, even after this reform, those with at least two years of prior affiliation could 
still receive benefits for anything between 30 and 60 months (Daniel & Bassot 1999, 
p. 54). 
 
In the 1980s and for much of the 1990s, the main French unemployment protection 
system responded to difficult economic circumstances and resultant retrenchment 
pressures in large part by reactivating and amplifying the contributory insurance logic 
that had, in fact, always been embedded in its institutional design.  Most striking is 
that not only employers encouraged this development, but trade unions, usually seen 
as the primary advocates of ‘decommodification’ and universal social rights, 
reluctantly agreed to it.  For French unions, adherence to an insurance-based 
conception of unemployment protection has had the double advantage of protecting 
their institutional role of co-managers of the unemployment protection system and, in 
the more recent period of austerity, of shielding the (previously) securely employed 
and older workers who form their core membership from the most stringent cost-
saving measures.  However the price to pay for this has been at least tacit acceptance 
that there will be a section of the workforce (and one which has grown in recent 
years) who are forced to rely on very different mechanisms of social support when out 
of work. 
 
 
EDUCATIONAL RELIEF: INSERTION POLICIES  
 
In many developed countries contributory unemployment insurance systems have 
always coexisted with non-contributory schemes of unemployment or general social 
assistance, the latter providing benefits as a fundamental right, although almost 
always on the basis of a means-test, to the most vulnerable groups among those in the 
workforce who cannot access insurance-based support when unemployed (Schmid & 
Reissert 1996).  Despite the clear insurance logic of French unemployment protection 
and its increasingly exclusionary implementation after the end of the ‘golden age’, 
until recently no such general encompassing scheme existed in France.  Instead, the 
limitations of insurance-based measures of social support for the unemployed were 
addressed through what in French are known as insertion policies, just as distant from 
the conventional logic of universal social rights as insurance. 
 
Insertion policies have their origins in debates around the future of still localised 
social assistance (aide sociale) provision in the early 1970s.  At this time, aide sociale 
was coming under increasing scrutiny for its purportedly passive nature, which saw it 
accused of being a contributory factor in what was in the process of being constructed 
as a new social problem in France: social exclusion.2  In the words of a 1976 report by 
the national social affairs inspectorate, traditional social assistance was increasingly 
seen as a ‘system for “the excluded” that, in itself, encourages exclusion’ (IGAS 
1976, p. 36).  But rather than calls for social assistance to be reformed and 
modernised, for example, by delocalising its management and removing its 
discretionary elements, it was instead suggested that it should be replaced with 
policies for so-called ‘global social action’ at the local level, in which local social 
service departments would ‘consecrate their activity to health promotion and social 
action rather than to generally passive social assistance’ (IGAS 1976, p. 36).  In this 
vision it was assumed that social insurance mechanisms would be sufficiently 
encompassing to provide adequate protection to all ‘normally integrated’ individuals 
faced with normal social risks, and that the role of any residual provision should be 
‘to bring individuals into a dynamic of social reintegration’ (Bec 1998, p. 113).  As 
IGAS (1976, p. 20) put it, ‘for a system of assistance in a certain manner maintaining 
exclusion will be substituted social security covering the social needs of all the French 
and social action facilitating individual and communal development’. 
 
Writing in the early twentieth century, the famous British social reformer William 
Beveridge articulated a strikingly similar vision of social protection for jobless 
people, based on a division of programmatic labour between a self-regulating inter-
professional social protection scheme to cover the cyclical and frictional employment-
related risks of industrial life, and a residual state-run scheme to ‘take in hand’ those 
for whom the absence of work was more structural, a sign of social deficiency or 
social handicap.  As Beveridge put it, ‘all tiding over should be a function of industry; 
all relief should be educational’ (Beveridge 1909, p. 234).  In the British context this 
vision was never realised, as attempts to institutionalise a ‘rational’ hierarchy between 
different forms of provision for specific groups in the jobless population came up 
against political conflict over the rights and duties of all those in receipt of ‘the dole’ 
(see Clegg 2005, pp. 148-153). However, on the other side of the channel, it was 
precisely such a hierarchical system of provision for the jobless that characterised 
unemployment insurance and insertion policy in the late 1970s, ironically at precisely 
the time when the always heroic belief in the ability to unproblematically classify the 
jobless population into ‘integrated’ and ‘excluded’ segments was being further 
undermined by fast rising unemployment in a context of external demand shocks and 
structural changes in the economy. 
 
The ideal of a division of labour between insertion and insurance, in which the 
question of unconditional rights for the jobless was simply sidestepped, initially 
proved relatively resilient even in the face of the accelerating employment crisis of 
the early 1980s.  Although in the early 1980s media attention in France came to focus 
on the ‘new poor’, new groups of individuals who were being thrown into poverty 
largely as a result of the economic downturn and the increasing scarcity of unskilled 
jobs, as employers tried to adapt to a more competitive economic environment 
through labour-saving strategies, policy for those without protection through 
contributory benefits still emphasised the promotional virtues of insertion policies for 
excluded populations, to which the new poor were quickly assimilated.  A high profile 
report on welfare policy prepared in 1983 for the then Socialist-led government thus 
spoke of the need for policy to be designed for ‘a sub-proletariat with shifting 
boundaries … that some join and some leave more or less durably only to return in an 
unfavourable [economic] circumstances, as is currently the case with a large part of 
those we call the “new poor’’ (CGP 1983, p. 10).  For this ‘sub-proletariat’ the report 
suggested that an extension of social security or assistance would be inappropriate, 
and instead recommended that income support should be provided only through 
policies aimed at actively reintegrating individuals into society (CGP 1983, pp. 
18-19). 
 
Even the previously discussed 1984 reform of unemployment insurance, which 
restricted access to contributory benefits, was not sufficient to immediately overcome 
the French resistance to assistance.  This reform was negotiated on the basis of the 
state taking over some social benefit responsibilities that had previously been 
discharged through UNEDIC, and the introduction of two new tax-financed benefit 
schemes for the unemployed, the Allocation Spécifique de Solidarité (ASS) and the 
Allocation d’Insertion (AI).  However these broke only marginally with the logic of 
benefit as a return on contributions.  The ASS was a means-tested benefit designed for 
the long-term unemployed, but only for those who had worked for five full years in 
the previous ten; contributory conditions that were actually stricter than those in the 
unemployment insurance system.  As for the flat-rate AI, access for its main group of 
target beneficiaries, young people, was restricted by the need to hold specific 
professional or vocational qualifications.  In any event, this benefit was all but 
scrapped in the 1992 budget of the Socialist government,3 who justified this by the 
need to redirect funds to more ‘active’ policy measures. 
 Thus it was mainly through insertion policies, which increasingly came to refer to 
special employment measures (Meyer 1999), that the government initially provided 
some social protection for those who were without work and who could not, or no 
longer, access unemployment insurance.  The earliest target of these measures was 
young people. Following the recommendations of a report entitled ‘Professional and 
Social Insertion of Young People’, the Socialist government introduced a massive 
scheme of temporary collective utility jobs in the public and para-public sectors for 
16-21 year olds in 1984, and extended it to 22-25 year olds in the following year.  
Similar measures for the long-term unemployed were introduced under the 
Conservative Chirac government between 1986 and 1988, and then merged with 
measures for the young into a new integrated scheme in 1989.  Throughout this period 
there was also extensive experimentation with, and investment in, insertion measures 
focused on private sector employment, mainly using the mechanism of time-limited 
social contribution holidays for employers hiring eligible workers.  Along with 
training measures, such measures are of course a standard feature of the 
unemployment policy arsenal of most developed countries, in addition to, and 
increasingly often as a condition for, basic rights to social benefit receipt.  What was 
unusual in France is that as insertion policies these measures were for a long time 
seen to be, and functioned as, alternatives to basic benefit entitlement for large groups 
of the unemployed (Enjorlas et al. 2001). 
 
 
TOWARDS RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 
 
From the middle of the 1980s, however, the limits of employment-based insertion 
policies as a form of front-line social protection at a time of very high unemployment 
became increasingly evident.  Employment policies are discretionary, not only at the 
level of government expenditures but also at that of inter-personal allocation.  With 
insertion measures, ‘trajectories’ of participation in measures (parcours d’insertion) 
were (and are) necessarily negotiated at the local level between the competent 
administrations, service providers and potential beneficiaries (Lafore 2008; Palier 
1998) on the basis of local opportunities and resource constraints.  The scope for 
inter-personal and inter-territorial inequalities in accessing basic social support was 
therefore large.  Many people fell through the net of provision altogether. 
 
It was in this context that calls for the introduction of a general minimum income 
scheme, basic social assistance, began to grow louder.  Even on the political left there 
was considerable reticence initially, with the ‘health and solidarity’ advisory group of 
the French Socialist Party arguing in 1986 that ‘the diversity of real situations requires 
diversified responses and personalised interventions much more than the systematic 
delivery of a cash benefit’ (cited in Belorgey 1988, pp. 105-106). [Belgorgey is not in 
the list of references] [DC – added in list]  This position was supported by most of 
the trade union movement too, with the Confédération Française Démocratique du 
Travail (CFDT) typical in worrying that ‘the logic of rights for all, however generous 
and seductive it may seem, rests on a rupture of the employment/income link’ (CFDT 
1987, p. 57). [CFDT is not in the list of references] [DC – Reference corrected in 
text and added in list]  However, just prior to the 1986 elections, the Socialist 
government did relent somewhat, announcing a number of experimental ‘poverty-
precariousness’ programmes in different localities, under which the state would help 
local authorities add minimum income provision to their battery of local insertion 
resources through a co-financing mechanism, on the understanding that income 
support would only be provided  if accompanied by more ‘integrative’ measures.  On 
their return to office following the elections, the Conservative government continued 
this experimentation with their own ‘plan against poverty and precariousness’, based 
on very similar principles. 
 
The breakthrough in progress on this issue owed less to a fundamental sea-change in 
policy attitudes than to the electoral strategy of François Mitterrand.  Seeking a social 
basis to mobilise on the left of the electorate, Mitterrand placed the fight against 
exclusion at the heart of his re-election campaign in 1988.  He pledged the creation of 
a national, compulsory and standardised minimum income scheme, symbolically 
financed out of an increase in the wealth tax paid by the highest earners.  In his 
campaign document – the ‘letter to all the French’ – he said that it was of ‘little 
importance’ if the new scheme was called a ‘guaranteed income’ or an ‘insertion 
income’, the essential thing instead being ‘to provide a means of living to those who 
have nothing, can do nothing, are nothing’ (Mitterrand 1988). 
 
In the event, the national minimum income scheme introduced after Mitterrand’s re-
election was named the Revenu Minimum d’Insertion (RMI), and under the RMI, the 
provision of cash benefits, entirely financed by the state, would be systematically 
accompanied by insertion measures, co-financed and organised by local authorities.  
The link between the benefit and accompanying insertion measures was to be 
established by the beneficiary and the competent administration signing an insertion 
contract, outlining measures of social and/or professional reintegration that would be 
undertaken during the benefit spell.  In the parliamentary debates, many, including 
many Socialists, spoke of the need for a tight relationship between benefit payment 
and insertion measures (Autes 1990; Paugam 1993).  Most saw work as the most 
important form of insertion, although largely due to the local authorities’ concerns 
about the resource implications of funding employment measures (Paugam 1993, p. 
109), the content of insertion in the framework of the RMI was defined rather more 
loosely. 
 
If the introduction of the RMI perpetuated the pre-existing ‘integrative model’ of 
basic social support (Lafore 2008), it also introduced innovative elements, by under-
girding this logic with basic social rights.  The RMI was not entirely universal; both 
recently arrived immigrants and childless people under the age of 25 were excluded 
from its personal scope of application.  However, for those whom it did cover, the 
RMI offered unconditional guarantees of support on the basis of their status as French 
citizens and/or residents alone.  The first article of the law of 1 December 1988 
creating the RMI stated, ‘[a]ny person who, as a result of their age, their physical or 
mental condition, [or] the economic and employment situation, is unable to work has 
the right to obtain reasonable means of existence from society’. The usage of the word 
‘right’ was prominent and significant, representing the resurgence of a jus naturale 
[should jusnaturalist be jus naturale?] [DC – not sure, but happy to go with that 
suggestion] (natural law or justice) notion that had been largely absent in this field in 
the post-war period (Lafore 2008, p. 122). 
 
In its first years of existence, the number of recipients of the RMI grew rapidly; from 
400 000 recipients in 1989 the caseload swelled to just under one million by 1995, or 
nearly two million if all the members of households in receipt of the benefit are 
included in the headcount.  Much of this growth was explained by transfers from 
unemployment insurance.  The biggest year-on-year increase in RMI receipt was in 
1993, following the restrictive reform of unemployment insurance in 1992.  However, 
in the light of this rapid growth, it proved difficult for local authorities to organise 
insertion measures to accompany income support.  Indeed the title of the report 
prepared by the national commission charged to evaluate the measure after its first 
three years of operation was, ‘An insertion dynamic that is still insufficient’.  Thus the 
RMI functioned to a large extent as a classic basic social assistance scheme. 
 
In the context of widespread agreement that the insertion dimension of the RMI 
should be reinforced, the understanding of the nature of the insertion dimension also 
began to evolve. From having been seen as a supplementary form of social support for 
RMI beneficiaries, the insertion dimension increasingly came to be understood as an 
individual quid pro quo for the right to benefit (see Hatchuel 1996).  With public 
debate focussing increasingly on the ‘drift to assistance’ (dérive assistencielle) of the 
RMI and the ‘disincentives’ and ‘inactivity traps’ facing its recipients, a succession of 
reform initiatives focused on promoting a ‘culture of responsibility’ among 
beneficiaries and speeding their return to the labour market by whatever means 
necessary (Clegg 2005, p. 208-211).  In 2005 the financial management of the benefit 
part of the RMI was decentralised to local authorities, mainly in a bid to increase the 
incentives to insertion requirements more rigorously (Join-Lambert & Tuchszirer 
2003).  In 2009 the RMI was replaced with an entirely new measure, the Revenu de 
Solidarité Active (RSA), in which the benefit can function as a permanent subsidy for 
low-paying employment in the private sector, to which beneficiaries are to be 
increasingly forcefully directed (Dujol & Grass 2009). 
 
In part as a result of the changing terms of the debate around the RMI, but also under 
the influence of international policy discourses around ‘activation’ (Eichhorst et al. 
2008), the enforcement of individual responsibilities in the economic sphere has also 
become increasingly central to reform debates around French unemployment 
insurance since the late 1990s.  In 2001, following the signature of a new agreement 
between the employers’ organisations and three of the main trade union 
confederations, the unemployment insurance benefit was renamed ‘return-to-work 
benefit’ (Allocation de Retour à l’Emploi).  Since then claimants have been obliged, 
much like recipients of the RMI/RSA, to sign a return-to-work plan (plan d’aide au 
retour à l’emploi – PARE) at the beginning of their benefit spell, detailing the 
measures they will undertake to find new employment.  As a result of the PARE, ‘the 
insured are required to a much greater extent than before to become active in striving 
for their reintegration into the labour market’ (Barbier & Kaufmann 2008, p. 85).  The 
2008 merger of the delivery-level agencies of the unemployment insurance system 
and the public employment service pushes in the same direction, seeking to improve 
enforcement of these enhanced job search obligations that unemployment insurance 
recipients now face (Willmann 2009). 
 
These reforms ran directly contrary to the traditional logic of unemployment 
insurance benefits, where contributions paid were previously a guarantee of a period 
of otherwise unconditional benefit receipt for the time necessary to find new work in 
line with the recipient’s skills and prior experience.  The logic of these reforms was 
essentially an economic one, based on a belated recognition that, in a largely service-
based economy, occupational mobility is now often necessary throughout working 
life.  But in questioning the entitlement dimensions of traditional insurance-based 
provision, these reforms have also helped to weaken the legitimacy of its eligibility 
aspects.  By emphasising the responsibilities of the insured unemployed to retrain and 
actively seek new kinds of employment, recent reforms have also provoked much 
livelier discussion about the rights of the unemployed to access unemployment 
insurance in the first place. 
 
The development and consolidation of activating approaches in French 
unemployment insurance has thus been accompanied by a gradual but perceptible 
shift away from the pseudo-contractual logic of eligibility, in which benefits were 
reserved only for ‘good contributors’.  The introduction of the PARE in 2001 was in 
fact already accompanied by a considerable relaxing of the contribution conditions for 
those with the shortest work records,4 and by the removal of the ‘degressivity’ 
mechanism under which the rate of benefit was calculated in relation to age, the 
length of the unemployment duration and the period of the unemployed individual’s 
prior affiliation.  These decisions were partly concessions designed to lever the 
unions’ agreement to the PARE, and were facilitated by the healthy budgetary 
position of UNEDIC after a number of years of relatively strong employment growth 
at the end of the 1990s.  But they also signalled a cautious shift towards a logic of 
citizenship-based rights to non means-tested support in unemployment, a development 
which subsequently continued.  In a newspaper article published in the first days of 
his campaign for the 2007 Presidential election, Nicolas Sarkozy suggested that in the 
future ‘unemployment benefit shouldn’t be based on the number of contributions paid, 
but above all take account of the objective difficulties that each person has to find 
employment’ (Sarkozy 2005).  Though this principle has not been fully implemented 
since his election, under unemployment insurance agreement effective from 2009, 
minimum contribution conditions have once again been reduced,5 and some limited 
benefit rights extended to young people with no work history.  Without the principle 
of some relationship between contributions and entitlements being abandoned 
completely, recent reforms have furthermore removed the ‘entitlement bonus’ that 
was long enjoyed by those with the very longest contribution records.6 
 
Thus, in the space of just two decades, there has been a fundamental shift in the logic 
of unemployment protection in France.  From a system of protection for the jobless 
organised around a programmatic division of labour between self-regulating insurance 
and promotional insertion, what has emerged is a structure in which there are two 
overlapping tiers of social support, each organised around a logic of basic rights 
counterbalanced with the assertion and enforcement of individual economic 
responsibilities, codified in ‘plans’ or ‘contracts’ established between the competent 
administration and the jobseekers.  Certainly, the rights and responsibilities of the 
beneficiary are not the same in these two tiers; unemployed recipients of the RMI 
(now RSA) receive benefit only on the basis of a means-test, and do not enjoy easy 
access to the better quality training and job-search support programmes that have been 
co-financed by UNEDIC for unemployment insurance recipients since 2001.  
However, there are signs today that the increasingly shared underlying logic, and the 
perceived need to better streamline and target the provision of labour market services, 
is drawing these different tiers of unemployment protection closer together.  Under 
the terms of the reform introducing the RSA, recipients who are immediately 
available for work must now register with the Pôle Emploi, the institution created by 
the merger between the unemployment insurance system and the public employment 
service.7  The reintegration of most recipients of the RSA and unemployment 
insurance will be managed through the same agency, and access to a more similar 
range of support services offered to each group.  Similarly, the 2008 Law on ‘the 
rights and responsibilities of jobseekers’ harmonised the suitable work criteria and 
benefit sanction regimes that apply to all jobseekers, irrespective of their benefit 
status.  Though there is some distance yet to travel, with an increasingly standardised 
conceptual framework regulating provision for the jobless in France, it can be 
anticipated that there will be further moves towards a more integrated legal and 
institutional framework in the years ahead. 
 
 
CONCLUSION: UNDERSTANDING AND ASSESSING THE NEW LOGIC OF 
UNEMPLOYMENT PROTECTION IN FRANCE 
 
The notion of basic or fundamental rights, open to all citizens or residents, has long 
been largely foreign to French unemployment protection policy.  As has been 
discussed in this chapter, those without work traditionally received support on one of 
two grounds; as ‘the insured’, in which case benefits were a return on contributions 
paid, or as ‘the excluded’, in which case public support was less a social right than a 
social service.  The reasons why this has changed in recent decades owes little to 
either the influence of changing international or regional legal norms or to domestic 
political advocacy in the name of rights, but is rather the result of a slow process of 
gradual institutional adaptation to a new economic and labour market context. 
 As we have seen, the pressure for the introduction of a rights-based minimum income 
scheme built up mainly as a result of the overburdening of conventional insertion 
policies in a context of high unemployment and the selective retrenchment of 
unemployment insurance provision.  Even then there was widespread resistance to the 
‘logic of rights’, including, and perhaps even especially, on the political left and 
amongst organised labour.  Though the right to ‘reasonable means of existence’ was 
proudly proclaimed in the first article of the law creating the RMI, politically the 
introduction of this measure was almost furtive, with far more rhetorical emphasis 
placed on the continuation of the integrative logic of insertion.  With respect to 
unemployment insurance, the impetus for change came more from activation 
initiatives introduced on supply-side labour market reallocation grounds.  These 
measures undermined the insurance logic on which non-means tested provision for 
the unemployed had traditionally rested in France, and in so doing created a 
discursive space in which the basis on which unemployed individuals access social 
support was more open to debate.  An approach to eligibility conditions that is more 
based on common citizenship has emerged in this context, but has been an effect 
rather than a driver of policy change in this sector. 
 
More broadly, as proponents of basic income measures have long accepted, if not 
necessarily trumpeted, individualised rights-based approaches to social protection 
actually mesh rather well with the operation of the increasingly flexible labour 
markets that characterise open, service-based economies (Van Parijs 1990).  From this 
perspective, the new logic of protection for the unemployed in France is a small but 
highly symptomatic part of the larger story of the country’s ‘long goodbye’ to a 
Bismarckian social protection system that was designed for an earlier, industrial era 
(Palier forthcoming 2010). 
 
Even if the turn to rights in French unemployment policy has not been driven by new 
legal norms at international or European level, it has, however, intersected with them.  
In 2000 the Committee of Social Rights of the Council of Europe concluded that the 
exclusion of childless under-25s from the scope of application of the RMI was, in the 
absence of any other basic social assistance scheme for this group, in contravention of 
the terms of article 13 of the revised Social Charter (Conclusions XV-1- 01/01/2000).  
The French government of the time was largely unmoved, arguing that the exclusion 
of young people was justified in the light of the desire not to create ‘inactivity traps’ 
that would dissuade young people from training or looking for work.  However when 
petitioned by a claimant, the French High Authority for the Fight Against 
Discrimination and For Equality returned to this issue in the wake of the introduction 
of the RSA, arguing that government’s response to the Committee of Social Rights 
was no longer valid given that receipt of the RSA can now be combined with income 
from work.  It therefore charged the government to prepare a report into the 
consequences of excluding under-25s from the scope of the new law, which was 
delivered in July 2009 (Commission de Concertation sur la Politique de la Jeunesse 
2009).  While the report only proposed the extension of the in-work component of the 
RSA to under-25s, it did bring forward new propositions on the system of social 
support for unemployed young people too, putting this important issue on the political 
agenda once again.  In this way, the introduction of a logic of rights for the 
unemployed may have self-reinforcing dynamics, with international or regional legal 
norms having an amplifying effect on domestic developments. 
 At the same time, this chapter has shown that the growing influence of a logic of 
rights in French unemployment protection has gone along with, and to an extent has 
even been driven by, an increasing emphasis on the economic responsibilities of the 
jobless.  The fact that the rights-based discourse around unemployment protection has 
grown in popularity coterminously with the responsibility-based discourse, and 
appears to have a shared cause, does not reduce the logical tension between the two.  
While in theory it may be possible for them to be reconciled through basic rights to 
‘active citizenship’ (Fredman 2008, p. 230-231) or even a renewed ‘right to work’ 
(Mundlak 2007), it seems just as likely that in practice the notions will continue to 
conflict rather than coalesce.  Given the political exposure of the unemployed as a 
group, especially at a time of economic austerity, there is a clear risk that policy 
attention will focus more on enforcing responsibilities than on consolidating rights in 
the years ahead. 
 
For this reason it is rather harder to assess the new logic of unemployment protection 
in France than it is to explain its emergence.  Its impact on jobless individuals is 
certainly differentiated according to their position in the occupational and social 
hierarchy. While it has arguably led to more solid and predictable guarantees of social 
support for ‘the excluded’, many of those who previously would have been able to 
simply ‘cash in’ their insurance contributions when involuntarily out of work, now 
find themselves subjected to closer behavioural controls than they would have in the 
past.  What is clear is that with the new logic of unemployment protection the 
treatment of the jobless in France is less institutionally settled than it was in the past, 
and, for better or for worse, will henceforth be subject to more explicit and visible 
negotiation and renegotiation through the democratic process. 
 
 
NOTES 
 
1. The concept of the welfare state is not entirely appropriate in the French case, where private actors – trade 
unions, employers and family associations – were given an important role in the management of the social security 
system implemented after the war.  As discussed below, this ‘private’ character of collective and compulsory 
social protection was underscored and accentuated with the later introduction of unemployment insurance.  
 
2. The first high profile work on the phenomenon of social exclusion in France was published in 1974 (Lenoir 
1974).  Its author had been head of the Direction d’Action Social, the agency charged with local social support 
policies, since 1970.  
 
3. After the 1991 reform only asylum seekers and recently released prisoners were eligible for AI.  AI was 
replaced in 2006 by a new benefit with similarly narrowly defined target groups, the Allocation Temporaire 
d’Attente.  
 
4. Where previously the minimum contribution condition was four months in the previous eight, this was extended 
in 2001 to 4 months in the previous 18, thus making it easier for people with unstable labour trajectories to access 
non-means tested benefits.  
 
5. The reform returned the minimum contribution condition to 4 months in 18 as it had been in 2001, reversing 
restrictive measures adopted in reforms in 2005.  What is novel is that this extension of rights for those with the 
shortest contribution histories occurred in a context where UNEDIC’s finances are under serious strain as a result 
of the global financial crisis.   
 
6. Concretely, the principle of entitlement in UNEDIC is now ‘one day of benefit for one day of contribution’.  In 
the past, many unemployed people with limited contribution records received benefit for a shorter time than that in 
which they had contributed, while the opposite was true for many of those with longer contribution histories.  
 
7. It is not necessary, however, for recipients of the RSA to be formally registered as unemployed.  The current 
French government presumably wanted to avoid the political cost paid by Gerhard Schroeder in Germany when, 
due to the introduction of the Hartz IV reform in 2005, the registration of work-ready social recipients as 
unemployed caused the open unemployment rate to rise from 10.8 per cent to 12.1 per cent almost overnight.  
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